From: The Museum of Modern Art <enews@moma.org>
To: Me
Sent: Monday, December 29, 2008 8:05:01 AM
Subject: Holidays at MoMA: Four of Six Highlights
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DECEMBER 27, 2008I'll post some key excerpts later..but the short story is:
The Isle That Rattled the World:Tiny Iceland Created a Vast Bubble, Leaving Wreckage Everywhere When It Popped
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123032660060735767.html
One thing that we would really like to see more of here in the United States is protests over economic and market conditions. We aren't quite sure why Wall Street types don't take to well... Wall Street after a 400 point drop in the Dow and start blowing their horns in unison.
For our money, the Ukraine has got it figured out:
Thousands of car drivers in the Ukrainian capital angrily blew their horns for several minutes Monday, protesting what they call incompetent and corrupt government policies that led to a devastating financial crisis.The Ukrainian currency has lost some 40 percent of its value since September as a fall in the export of steel, the heart of the economy, led to a shortage of foreign currency. That was coupled with a loss of confidence in the hryvna and the banking system.
"We've had enough of the authorities," said one protester, Ihor Ratushny.
Damn authorities.
I think it's a fascinating story, just aside from everything else. I'm horrified, I'm scared, but I'm also just professionally awed and fascinated by what's going on. Every macroeconomist, which is what I am--well, half of me is a macroeconomist--every macroeconomist sort of has a lingering desire to live through the early stages of the Great Depression, to know what it was like..and here we are."
ARCH = AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticy
GARCH = Generalized AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticy
| Exploring alternative 1-month volatility forecasting techniques |
Heartrending story in the Times about the woes of South Carolina. In fact, unemployment rates in the Southeast have risen more than in the United States as a whole; there's a sort of Slump Belt extending from the industrial Midwest down to the Carolinas.
Why is this happening? The Slump Belt does sort of look like the "auto corridor"; maybe what we're seeing is the geographical location of cyclically sensitive manufacturing industries. Anyway, it's striking that the worst of the crisis is hitting states that largely didn't experience a housing bubble.
How India Avoided a Crisis
In India, banks usually don't lend money to people who lack the means to pay it back. Any lessons to be learned, class?
December 20, 2008
"India had a bank regulator who was the anti-Greenspan. His name was Dr. V. Y. Reddy, and he was the governor of the Reserve Bank of India...in the irascible Mr. Reddy, who took office in 2003 and stepped down this past September, it had exactly the right man in the right job at the right time."
"Our regulators, unlike theirs, just stood by and let it happen. The next time we're moving into bubble territory, perhaps we can take a page from Mr. Reddy's book — sometimes it's better to apply the brakes too early than too late. Or, as was the case with Mr. Greenspan, not at all.
•
None of this is to say that the global credit crisis hasn't affected India. It certainly has. I'll be back after the holidays with more columns from India, including how Sept. 15 — the day Lehman Brothers defaulted — changed everything, even here, on the other side of the world."
Turns out I was almost right; according to the current version of the Wikipedia entry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_DiMaggio), Joltin' Joe
DiMaggio was born in Martinez, CA, which is in the SF Bay Area (specifically, "Martinez is located on the south side of the Carquinez Strait in the San Francisco Bay Area, directly facing the city of Benicia" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martinez,_California)
The first few paragraphs of the Wikipedia entry for Joe Dimaggio are included below:
DiMaggio was the eighth of nine children born to immigrants Giuseppe (1872–1949) and Rosalia (Mercurio) DiMaggio (1878–1951), delivered by a midwife identified on his birth certificate as Mrs. J. Pico. He was named after his father; "Paolo" was in honor of Giuseppe's favorite saint, Saint Paul. The family moved to San Francisco, California when Joe was one year old.
Giuseppe was a fisherman, as were generations of DiMaggios before him. Joe's brother, Tom, told Joe's biographer Maury Allen that Rosalia's father, also a fisherman, wrote to her that Giuseppe could earn a better living in California than in their native Isola delle Femmine, an islet off the coast of Sicily. After being processed on Ellis Island, he worked his way across the country, eventually settling near Rosalia's father in Pittsburgh, California. After four years, he was able to earn enough money to send for her and their daughter, whom was born after he had left for the United States.
It was Giuseppe's hope that his five sons would become fisherman. Joe recalled that he would do anything to get out of cleaning his father's boat, as the smell of dead fish made him nauseous. Giuseppe called him "lazy" and "good for nothing." told Giuseppe's opposition was due to not understanding how baseball could help Joe "get away from the poverty" and make something of himself.
Joe was playing semi-pro ball when Vince, playing for the San Francisco Seals, talked his manager into letting Joe fill in at shortstop; he made his professional debut on October 1, 1932. From May 27 – July 25, 1933, he got at least one hit in a PCL-record 61 consecutive games: "Baseball didn't really get into my blood until I knocked off that hitting streak. Getting a daily hit became more important to me than eating, drinking or sleeping."
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In one of the most ill-advised pieces of PR I can remember, Bob Rubin has given an on-the-record interview to the WSJ, in which he takes no blame or responsibility for anything which has gone wrong at Citigroup. The reaction in the blogosphere has been, predictably, swift and brutal, helped along by the fact that Rubin's famous charm clearly hasn't worked on his interviewers, Ken Brown and David Enrich. Here's their lede:
Under fire for his role in the near-collapse of Citigroup Inc., Robert Rubin said its problems were due to the buckling financial system, not its own mistakes, and that his role was peripheral to the bank's main operations even though he was one of its highest-paid officials.
It just gets worse from there: by refusing to admit to any mistakes at all, Rubin has garnered himself zero sympathy. Rubin has been surprisingly bulletproof until now: while he's had many critics, his reputation has largely remained intact. But with this interview, it's disappeared at a stroke: no one can read it and think of him as anything other than a pompous and out-of-touch plutocrat, puffed up with much more self-regard than common sense.
For instance, he's quick to the not-my-bailiwick defense:
Mr. Rubin said it is a company's risk-management executives who are responsible for avoiding problems like the ones Citigroup faces. "The board can't run the risk book of a company," he said. "The board as a whole is not going to have a granular knowledge" of operations.
But board members don't get paid $115 million. If he wasn't playing a central role when it came to Citi's risk book, what was he doing for the money? It's not clear, but his comments don't help much:
Mr. Rubin said his pay was justified and that there were higher-paying opportunities available to him. "I bet there's not a single year where I couldn't have gone somewhere else and made more," he said.
Justified? What does that possibly mean? And as for making more money elsewhere, I suspect that many Citigroup shareholders wish that he'd done precisely that. But not only was Rubin incredibly well-paid, he also had to all intents and purposes tenure at Citigroup: as a member of the board, he was an employer of the CEO rather than an employee, so there was really no one who could fire him.
The most astonishing instance of Rubin failing to justify his salary, however, comes later:
Mr. Rubin was deeply involved in a decision in late 2004 and early 2005 to take on more risk to boost flagging profit growth, according to people familiar with the discussions. They say he would comment that Citigroup's competitors were taking more risks, leading to higher profits. Colleagues deferred to him, as the only board member with experience as a trader or risk manager...
At the time, Mr. Rubin was saying in speeches that most assets were overvalued. He would quote a noted investor he knew as saying that "the only undervalued asset class in the world is risk."
But it wouldn't have been right for the board to act on his concerns, Mr. Rubin said in the interview: "I wouldn't run a financial institution based on someone's view about what markets would do."
The cognitive disconnect here is simply staggering. Rubin's going around saying that institutions are taking on too much risk, but he's also telling the Citi board that it should take on even more risk. He had no problem with the board following his lead when he said he wanted Citi to take extra risks, but he says that he would have had a problem with the board listening to his concerns about doing so. For this he thinks his $115 million is justifiable?
[go to Market Movers for the rest]